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INTRODUCTION
The Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") raises several legal arguments in its
opposing brief that require response. Most importantly, however, UBMC insists on
repeating an unsubstantiated factual claim. UBMC repeatedly asserts that its reason for
tenninating the professional services contract (the "Agreement") with Dr. Hardy was that
Dr. Hardy's services no longer met the medical needs of the Uintah Basin community. In
the days and weeks before and after he was fired, Dr. Hardy was never told his services
weren't satisfactory. In fact, UBMC never claimed Dr. Hardy's services no longer met
the medical needs of the community until well into discovery, when UBMC realized it
would have to come up with some legal reason for terminating Dr. Hardy. And no
UBMC administrator or physician ever testified that there was any concern about the
adequacy of Dr. Hardy's services. UBMC simply decided to fire Dr. Hardy because an
opportunity arose to hire a physician, Dr. Thomas J. Allred, who could work both in the
emergency room and as a pathologist. UBMC did not have, and would not have in the
conceivable future, enough work to hire a full-time pathologist. But by hiring Dr. Allred,
UBMC could claim to have an on-site, resident pathologist in rural Utah. In the
competitive world of rural medicine, such bragging rights might give UBMC a chance to
lure patients away from nearby Ashley Valley Medical Center, located 70 miles away in
Vernal, Utah. Dr. Hardy's contract was merely a pesky legal obstacle, and UBMC called
in its lawyers to take care of it

1

This factual background is not, as may seem at first blush, gratuitous. It is critical,
for it underscores why this Court must adopt a rule of law in Utah that requires
governmental entities to honor legitimate, beneficial contracts, while at the same time not
impeding successor governments' ability to respond to the electorate's demands and the
population's needs.1 Without a clear, policy-based legal test to determine the
enforceability of long-term government contracts, trial courts will continue to flounder
when assessing the enforceability of extended contracts with government entities. The
unilateral avoidance of such contracts will allow UBMC to entice talented professionals
to work for them by offering long-term contracts, and then, when a better deal
fortuitously comes along, they can void the contract and escape paying damages. Not
only would this injustice affect those contracting with government, like Dr. Hardy, but it
would also adversely affect government entities like UBMC:
"It is obvious that a too rigid adherence to the principal [that successors
should not be bound to some contracts] would leave [government entities]
nursing a mere theory—in the possession of an important governmental
power without practical means for its exercise, and unable to take any
important public work, since no concern would equip itself and undertake
the project when the incoming administration, the product perhaps of

1

Because this appeal comes before the Court after the entry of summary judgment
on stipulated facts, and because this Court must address only the legal question of
whether UBMC could void the Agreement as improperly binding successor
boards, there is no factual record on appeal. The many contested facts in this case
do not need to be resolved for this Court to determine whether the rule of law
invoked by UBMC applies in Utah. However, these facts are important to
illustrate the problems inherent in allowing government entities to void contracts
at will.
2

political accident, might repudiate the contract at will during its
performance/'2
Because the consequences for government and private citizens alike are enormous,
this Court should adopt a policy-based case-by-case test for determining whether a
municipal contract is enforceable beyond the term of the appointed officers who initially
entered the contract. Under such a test, this Court should find that, as a matter of law, Dr.
Hardy's contract is enforceable because it did not impair future boards' pohcy-making
role, it was necessary and advantageous at the time it was entered into, and the "just
cause" provision allowed future UBMC boards of trustees to terminate the Agreement if
Dr. Hardy's services ever failed to meet the community's medical needs. Alternatively,
this Court should remand this case to the trial court for a further factual development of
whether, under the circumstances, Dr. Hardy's "just cause" contract was justified.
ARGUMENT
L

UBMC'S ASSERTION THAT DR. HARDY'S SERVICES NO LONGER
MET THE MEDICAL NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY IS SIMPLY A
PRETEXT AND UNDERSCORES THAT THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT
A RULE THAT WILL ALLOW ENFORCEMENT OF BENEFICIAL,
LONG-TERM GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
When UBMC gave Dr. Hardy 90 days notice that it was terminating the

Agreement, it never informed Dr. Hardy that the pathology services he provided no
longer met the community's medical needs. In fact, UBMC gave no official reason for

2

Mariano & Associates, P.C. v. Board of County Comm 'rs, 737 P.2d 323, 329
(Wyo. 1987). (quoting Plant Food v. City of Charlotte, 199 SJE. 712 (1938)).
3

terminating the Agreement. Prior to Dr. Hardy's termination, UBMC never surveyed or
questioned the UBMC medical staff to determine if a resident pathologist was critical to
the hospital's needs or if Dr. Hardy was not providing the pathology services needed by
UBMC. It was not until UBMC filed its memorandum opposing Dr. Hardy's first motion
for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim that UBMC began arguing it had
"just cause" to terminate the Agreement.
The supposed failure of Dr. Hardy to meet the community's medical needs was an
afterthought conjured up by UBMC to mask its desire to hire another doctor who they
thought might be a "better deal." After Dr. Hardy's motion for summary judgment and
UBMC's cross motion for summary judgment were denied, Dr. Hardy began the
discovery process. Although Dr. Hardy deposed key UBMC administrators and
physicians, no one ever testified that UBMC had concluded that Dr. Hardy's services
were inadequate. In fact, UBMC's chief administrator, Bradley LeBaron, admitted
during his deposition that—when Dr. Hardy pointed out UBMC did not have "just cause"
to tenninate the Agreement—he informed Dr. Hardy that UBMC's lawyers would find a
way out.
It took a while. After extensive discovery, Dr. Hardy renewed his motion for
summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, and UBMC renewed its crossmotion. UBMC argued in its renewed cross-motion that the Agreement was terminable
"at will," or that the court must infer a two-year duration, or that UBMC had legitimate

4

business reasons to terminate the Agreement (See R. 524-26.) In its reply brief, UBMC
raised for the first time in more than three years of litigation, the legal argument that
contracts with governmental entities are not enforceable beyond the term of the officers
who entered into the contract, and thus the Agreement had been legally terminated.
This fact scenario epitomizes why courts have criticized as unsound a rule of law
that allows government entities to enter into a long-term contract when it is convenient
and later repudiate it: " \ . . we know of no reason why a city, as well as an individual,
should not be expected to keep faith with those with whom it contracts, or else respond in
damages for its failure." Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 140 P.2d 392, 397 (Cal.
1943) (en banc), rev 'd on other grounds, Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
Because governmental entities should be required to honor their contractual
obligations unless the contract actually does impair that entity's ability to enact policy,
this Court should adopt a test that will allow enforcement of long-term contracts that are
appropriate under the circumstances. As discussed below, Dr. Hardy and UBMC agree
that Utah should adopt a policy-based test that allows trial courts to analyze the factual
background and policy implications of long term government contracts to determine
whether they are enforceable.

5

H.

DR. HARDY AND UBMC AGREE THAT THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT
A POLICY-BASED CASE-BY-CASE TEST FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A CONTRACT BINDING A GOVERNING BODY'S
SUCCESSORS IS ENFORCEABLE
Both UBMC and Dr. Hardy urge this Court to reject the governmental/proprietary

test and adopt a case-by-case approach to determining whether a contract binding a
governmental body's successors is enforceable. While Dr. Hardy urges a modified Plant
Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 199 S.E. 712, 714 (N.C. 1938) test, {see Hardy Br. at 2528), UBMC argues primarily for the test articulated in Mariano & Associatesy P.C. v.
Board of County Commissioners, 737 P.2d 323, 331-32 (Wyo. 1987). (UBMC Br. at 17,
31.) Specifically, Dr. Hardy has asked this Court to adopt a test which focuses on
"'whether the enforcement of the contract would impair, to any significant degree, the
new body's exercise of its policymaking role.5" (Hardy Br. at 26 (quoting Lobolito, Inc.
v. NorthPocono Sch Dist, 722 A.2d 249, 252 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)), rev'don

other

grounds, 755 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 2000).) The Mariano test that UBMC urges requires a
court to determine whether "the necessity and benefit to the governmental unit" justified
the long-term contract when it was entered into. Mariano, 737 P.2d 329. If the duration
of the contract was justified at the time the agreement was made, the contract must be
enforced against successors. Id. Thus Plant Food focuses on whether the contract
impinges on policymaking, whereas Mariano focuses on whether the contract was
beneficial at the time the contract was entered into.

6

A.

This Court Should Use Mariano's Test As Factors To Consider Under
the Modified Plant Food Test

The difference between the tests Dr. Hardy and UBMC advocate is minimal. In
fact, the Mariano test UBMC urges is, like the test Dr. Hardy advocates, derived from
Plant Food See Mariano, 131 P.2d at 329 ("In reasoning, we generally follow the
principal case, Plant Food Co, v. City of Charlotte . . . . "). Dr. Hardy agrees that the
Mariano test—whether the contract was "necessary" and "beneficial to" the government
at the time it was made—provides useful factors for detenniiiing whether a long-term
government contract is enforceable against successors. Indeed, this Court should, in
fashioning an appropriate policy-based test, suggest specific factors for trial courts to
examine in determining whether a contract improperly impairs future elected officials'
policymaking ability. To that end, Dr. Hardy urges this Court not to adopt the Mariano
test as is, but rather to use the test as factors to consider in making the ultimate
assessment of whether the contract "impairfs], to any significant degree, the new body's
exercise of its policymaking role." Hence the resulting test should primarily focus on
policymaking considerations and secondarily focus on the utility of the contract at issue.

Janice Griffith, perhaps the leading commentator on the deficiencies of the
governmental/proprietary test for municipal contracts, suggests five factors to
determine whether a long-term municipal contract should be upheld. A contract
must be enforced if:
the formation of the contract is not the result of fraud, corruption, or bad
faith; (2) the contract does not modify the legal structure under which the
governmental body is organized and operates; (3) the contract advances a
governmental interest that outweighs the loss of governmental control; (4)
7

If this Court does decide, however, to adopt the Mariano test as is, then Dr.
Hardy's contract is enforceable.
B.

Under the Mariano Test Advocated by UBMC, Dr. Hardy's Contract Is
Enforceable Because, Under the Circumstances, A "Just Cause"
Contract Was Justified

Because Dr. Hardy's "just cause" contract was necessary and appropriate under
the circumstances, it is enforceable, as a matter of law, against UBMC successor boards
under Mariano. Although UBMC does not explain why the Mariano test should be
adopted, the standard does have several advantages over the governmental/proprietary
test, including a detailed description of the parties' burdens, and cogent guidelines for
instructing trial courts how to determine whether a contract is enforceable.
First and foremost, Mariano recognizes that the policy rationale for banning longterm government contracts is central to fashioning any test for determining their
enforceability.4 As noted above, Mariano, closely follows Plant Food Co. v. City of
Charlotte, 199 S.E. 712, 714 (N.C. 1938), the case Dr. Hardy uses for his proposed test

the contract restrains the operation of governmental functions no further than
necessary and for no longer than necessary to accomplish governmental
objectives; and (5) circumstances have not so changed as to cause the
contract's continued performance to result in substantial harm to the public.
Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the
Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IowaL. Rev. 277, 348 (1990).
4
While Mariano acknowledged the importance of the policy underlying the ban on
long-term government contracts, the Mariano test fails to actually ensure that this
important policy is not undermined, since the test only focuses on the utility of
the contract.
8

{See Appellant's Br. at 25-28.) In fashioning its rule, the Mariano
Court explained:
In reasoning, we generally follow the principal case, Plant Food Co. v. City
of Charlotte, involving a contract to remove sludge where the court stated:
"It is not to be supposed that because the general
subject may belong to the field of government powers no
detail of administration may be carried out by contract, or that
such contract must be completed within the term of the
contracting council. The true test is whether the contract
itself deprives a governing body, or its successor, of a
discretion which public policy demands should be left
unimpaired."
Id. at 329 (quoting Plant Food, 199 S.E. at 714). Mariano also recognizes that only rare
circumstances require a court to void an otherwise enforceable long-term contract:
One could guess that perhaps a million contracts have been entered into by
all levels of government in Wyoming since 1933, and the fact that only two
have been successfully challenged and appealed before the case at bar
amply demonstrates that the accepted purview of the voidability principle is
narrow and confined Application of the many cases reviewed invokes a
description of hop-scotch law lacking consistency or logical justification
except perforce to protect the public from seriously inopportune
arrangements or deny predecessors] rights to hire advisors for the next
regime. As a safety valve as corollary to the legislative jurisdiction, the
prin ciple deserves confin ed retention.
Mariano, 111 P.2d at 331 (emphases added).
Under Mariano, a newly elected governing body can always assert that a contract
entered into by its predecessor is voidable. Then, however, the burden shifts to the party
contracting with the government, who may then raise as an affirmative defense that, at
the time the contract was entered into, "under the facts and circumstances, [it was]

9

necessary and appropriate," id at 330, or "of a definable advantage to the city or
governmental body." Id. at 332. The court must then determine, as a matter of law,
whether the contract is enforceable. Id
In analyzing the utility of the contract at issue, the Mariano court found no reason
that an accounting contract with the county board of commissioners should extend for
two years other than for "vendor economic opportunity." Id. The court did, however,
discuss circumstances that might warrant an accounting contract for longer than one year
(the length of the county commissioners' term) including: (1) accounting firms bidding a
lower price for a two-year rather than one-year contract; (2) qualified accounting firms
only agreeing to a contract for a two-year term; and (3) county commissioners requesting
a longer contract because "experience and acquaintanceship" were important for county
audits. Id
In this case, the second and third circumstances the Mariano court listed were
present when Dr. Hardy entered into the Agreement with UBMC in 1994. At that time,
the "just cause" provision was critical to Dr. Hardy. Because Dr. Hardy was embarking
on an enterprise to set up a network of pathology services in rural Utah, it was critical for
him to have a commitment from UBMC. Dr. Hardy's network involved providing
service to the Vemal\Roosevelt area, and to Price. None of these hospitals had enough
pathology work to sustain a full-time pathologist. Only in combination did the enterprise
provide enough work for Dr. Hardy.

10

Further, as a pathologist, Dr. Hardy is a "doctor's doctor" in that he works closely
with physicians in assisting them to diagnose and treat their patients. For example, while
operating on a patient, a surgeon will remove a sample (e.g., a frozen section) of
potentially cancerous tissue and have it immediately examined by a pathologist while the
patient is still on the operating table. The pathologist will then determine if the sample is
cancerous and the extent to which the diseased tissue needs to be removed. That
information is immediately conveyed to the surgeon who can then proceed with the
surgery. Such a relationship demands that the treating physician be absolutely confident
in the diagnostic skills of the pathologist. Thus, continuity and "acquaintanceship" were
not just desirable but necessary. Under the factors identified in Mariano, this Court
should find Dr. Hardy's contract was necessary and advantageous when the parties
agreed to it.
The Mariano court does note that personal service contracts with doctors, lawyers,
and accountants involve "trust and reliance" so that there may be a greater need to allow
termination of such contracts when trust and reliance has been impaired. Id at 331.
However, in the case of Dr. Hardy's contract, successor UBMC boards could always
terminate the contract if they did not trust in or could not rely upon Dr. Hardy pursuant to
the "just cause" provision. In this case, there is no evidence that the UBMC board lost
faith in Dr. Hardy. Rather, the UBMC board simply terminated the Agreement so that
they could hire a pathologist who could also provide emergency room services. In

11

essence, what appeared to be a better deal came along, and UBMC wanted out of the
Agreement as a matter of convenience.5
Considering the facts and circumstances in this case, this Court should find the
Agreement is enforceable under Mariano. At a minimum, if the Court adopts Mariano, it
should remand the case to allow further development of a factual record so that Dr. Hardy
can present a defense as to why the "just cause" contract was necessary and appropriate
under the circumstances.
III.

IF TfflS COURT RETAINS THE GOVERNMENTAL/ PROPRIETARY
TEST, IT SHOULD RULE THAT PROVIDING PATHOLOGY SERVICES
IS NOT A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
If this Court decides to retain the governmental/proprietary test for determining

whether a long-term municipal contract is voidable, it should find that running a hospital
is proprietary, and thus Dr. Hardy's contract is enforceable. According to UBMC,
running a hospital is a governmental function because "a significant number of Utah
5

Although UBMC maintains its reason for terminating the Agreement was so that
it could provide on-site pathology services, and, theoretically, better medical
services to the Uintah Basin, there are serious questions as to whether UBMC
properly investigated Dr. Alfred's credentials before deciding to hire him. For
example, when the UBMC Board of Trustees voted to terminate Dr. Hardy's
contract and hire Dr. Allred, it was not aware that Dr. Allred had been sanctioned
by the State of Florida Board of Medicine for malpractice relating to a
misdiagnosis of a lung infection as cancer. Further, the medical staff did not
evaluate Dr. Allred's fitness or make a recommendation on whether he should be
hired, contrary to UBMC's own by-laws. (See UBMC Bylaws, R. 999, attached
to Dr. Hardy's opening brief as addendum D.) And UBMC offered Dr. Allred a
position without ever talking with anyone who could comment about Dr. Allred's
skills as a pathologist.
12

cases" have so held. (UBMC Br. at 23.) However, the only case that considers the issue
after Standifordv. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980)—which re-defined
Utah's governmental/proprietary test for tort immunity—recognized that the University
of Utah-owned hospital functioned as a private hospital. See Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion). Justice Durham's opinion
recognized that the simple fact that a hospital is owned by the government does not mean
that all activities of the hospital are governmental. ". . . notwithstanding the fact that it
is a government-owned health care facility, the University Hospital, in its patient care
programs, virtually operates in the private sector, competing with other private, nonprofit
entities, as well as with for-profit hospitals. In the area of patient service, it is not in the
business of establishing government policy." Id. at 364 (plurality opinion) (emphases
added).
Justice Durham thus acknowledged in Condemarin what Dr. Hardy pointed out in
his opening brief: That analysis of the governmental/proprietary distinction must focus
on the activity at issue, not simply on whether one party is an arm of government (Hardy
Br. at 14). Further, Justice Durham acknowledges, as Dr. Hardy has argued, that inquiry
into whether a governmental entity may be sued must focus on whether the activity at
issue involved formulating government policy. And Justice Durham has also recognized
what Dr. Hardy has consistently argued, that providing patient services—which includes
pathology services—simply does not involve government policymaking. In short,

13

Condemarin strongly supports the conclusion that Dr. Hardy's contract for pathology
services involved a non-governmental function.
UBMC attempts to distinguish Condemarin by pointing out that UBMC does not
compete with private and non-profit hospitals as did the University Hospital, because
UBMC runs the only hospital in Duchesne County. (UBMC Br. at 25.) While it may be
the only hospital in Duchesne County, UBMC is in competition with the private hospital
in Vernal, Ashley Valley Medical Center, a fact that UBMC would not deny. Thus
UBMC differs from the University Hospital only in that the competitive market in the
Roosevelt/Vernal area is smaller than the Salt Lake City market.
In short, the only -post-Standiford case that considers whether operation of a
government-owned hospital is a governmental function strongly supports Dr. Hardy's
position that UBMC was not engaged in a governmental function when it contracted with
Dr. Hardy for pathology services.
UBMC's argument that operating a county hospital is necessarily a governmental
function is equally unconvincing. UBMC claims that under Standiford, operating a
county hospital can only be performed by a governmental agency because "it is evident
that operating a county hospital, the establishment of which is authorized by statute . . .
can only be accomplished by a county." (UBMC Br. at 26.) This assertion is belied by
UBMC's admission that, in fact, the hospital is currently run by "a non-profit, 501(c)(3)
community hospital organization." (Id. at 25 n.7.)

14

IV.

THERE ARE COMPELLING POLICY REASONS FOR EXEMPTING
STAGGERED AND/OR APPOINTED BOARDS FROM THE GENERAL
RULE BARRING LONG-TERM GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS
A.

The Very Purpose of A Staggered Board Is To Allow Continuity in
Policies, Which Requires Long-term Contracts

Staggered government boards have been traditionally exempt from the rale barring
long-term municipal contracts for good reason. Staggered terms of officers, whether in
municipal or private corporations, function "to assure the continuity and stability of the
corporation's business strategies and policies as determined by the board." Committee
on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining to
Directors and Officers, 54 Bus Law 1233, 1238 (May 1999).6
This basic purpose of staggered boards is so fundamental that it is not discussed in
the cases applying the staggered board exception. Rather, the court, or treatise, simply
acknowledges that a staggered board is continuous, and thus "successors" cannot be
impermissibly bound. See, eg,

10 Eugene McQuillan, The Law ofMunicipal

Corporations, § 29.101 ("Where a municipal body is a board or commission, the terms of
the members of which are staggered, it is a continuous body, existing in perpetuity; and

6

UBMC claims that some cases Dr. Hardy cites "erroneously" refer to municipal
bodies as corporations. (UBMC Br. at 39.) According to UBMC, comparing
municipalities to corporations is "misguided." (Id.) However, municipalities are
commonly described as corporate bodies, as in, for example, Eugene McQuillin's
often-cited treatise, The Law ofMunicipal Corporations. The fact of the matter is
that municipal bodies, such as the UBMC Board of Trustees, function very much
like corporations, and borrow heavily from corporate models.
15

contracts of such a body cannot be deemed to bind or restrict successors in office."); Daly
v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1953) (holding that because board was staggered "the
City commission is a continuing body and may contract for any reasonable time"). It is
clear, however, that in achieving its purpose of maintaining stable, continuous policies, a
staggered board very often must enter into contracts that extend for more than the term of
any single member of the board. For a staggered board to achieve continuity in policies,
the rule barring long-term contracts should not apply. Common sense also dictates that
the policy reason for barring long-term contracts does not come into play when a board is
staggered. When a majority of a board remains each year, the specter of the outgoing
political regime entering into midnight contracts, tying the new board's hands, is simply
not possible.
Arguing that there is no sound policy reason for exempting staggered boards,
UBMC cites Piedmont Public Service District v. Cowart, 459 S.E.2d 876, 882 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1995). Piedmont notes that policy concerns apply equally to staggered boards
because the concern that government bodies should be free to serve the public as
changing needs dictate "is present with all municipal bodies, whether or not the board or
commission technically is a continuing body because the terms of its members are
staggered or because the board has perpetual existence." Id at 882. However, as the
court later noted, the staggered board exception does not apply if the duration of the
contract is unreasonable. See id at 882 (citing Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of
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Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976); Daly v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1953); 63
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 979(b), 987). The Piedmont court held the contract at
issue would not be enforceable under the staggered exception because 20 years "is not a
reasonable duration for an employment contract for the administrator of a public service
district, a position of utmost importance to the public, and one that requires the trust and
cooperation of the commissioners." Piedmont, 459 S.E.2d at 882. Thus the staggered
board rule does not apply when, in fact, the contract does impinge on a governing body's
policy-making role, as the contract obviously did in Piedmont.
The staggered board exception functions as a presumption that a long-term
contract entered into by a staggered board, which by its nature is designed to ensure
stability and continuity, is enforceable. But if the contract impairs an important
government function, it will be voidable.
Many courts, as well as treatises, have recognized the staggered board exception
for good reasons. This Court should also recognize that staggered boards serve an
important function for governmental bodies of providing stability and continuity in
policies, and such boards should accordingly be allowed to enter into reasonable longterm contracts.
B.

Appointed Boards Do Not Directly Serve The Electorate As Elected
Boards Do

As with staggered boards, the policy underpinning the ban on long-term
government contracts does not apply to appointed boards. The reason the rationale does
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not apply is that appointed board members, like the members of UBMC's Board of
Trustees, very often serve for a period beyond the term of the elected official who
appointed them. Such board members may continue to implement the policies of the
elected official who appointed him or her, even after a new official, with a different
agenda, is elected. Thus an appointed board member does not directly serve the
electorate in the same fashion as an elected board.
In cases where an entire new board is appointed each time a new official
responsible for the appointments is elected, then Dr. Hardy agrees with UBMC that there
is no distinction between an appointed and an elected board. However, most appointed
boards, like UBMC, involve staggered appointments, with board members typically
serving consecutive terms. In such cases, long-term contracts make sense because they
serve the purpose of stability and continuity and because there is never a definable
moment when a "successor" board is constituted, so there is no "successor" to be
impermissibly bound.
In short, policy considerations and common sense dictate that staggered, appointed
boards should not be subject to the rule prohibiting an elected governing body from
entering into contracts that bind successors. The very purpose of staggered, appointed
boards—to provide continuity and stability—is undermined if they are prohibited from
entering into contracts for more than one year.
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V.

THE "EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT" EXCEPTION IS A RECOGNIZED
EXCEPTION, AND DOES APPLY UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS CASE
UBMC claims that there is "no universal exception" that excepts the rule barring

long-term municipal contracts from employment contracts. There is no doubt that the
rules of law in the area of municipal contracts area are neither clear-cut nor consistent,
and certainly not universal As one court observed:
Application of the many cases reviewed invokes a description of hopscotch law lacking consistency or logical justification . . . . Any separately
stated and explicitly defined principle, rule or standard applied to
individualized factual situations found in review of precedent has as many
holes as a rural intersection highway sign.
Mariano, 737 P.2d at 331 n.5. And while it is difficult to extract even clear "minority"
rules, there are a number of recognized rules in the case law and treatises, and the
"employment contract exception" is one such recognized rule. (See Hardy Br. at 31-33.)
UBMC does correctly point out that the employment rule essentially is a version of the
governmental/proprietary rule, (see UBMC Br. at 43), in that the rule allows long-term
contracts for employment positions that do not involve "governmental" functions. See
10A Municipal Corp. § 29.101 at 46.
However, the employment contract test is better defined than the traditional
governmental/proprietary test. It calls for enforcement of the contract unless "the nature
of an office or employment is such that it requires a municipal board or officer to exercise
supervisory control" over the appointee. Id Ultimately, as demonstrated in Dr. Hardy's
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opening brief, this inquiry focuses on whether the employee implements policy. (Hardy
Br. at 32-33.) Because this inquiry focuses on the critical policy question of whether the
long-term contract impairs future boards' policymaking role, it is an appropriate,
workable test. Accordingly, this Court should find that Dr. Hardy's contract is
enforceable under the employment contract exception.7
VI.

THE AGREEMENT'S "JUST CAUSE" PROVISION ALLOWS UBMC TO
TERMINATE IT IF DR. HARDY'S SERVICES FAIL TO MEET THE
NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY, A DETERMINATION WHICH IS A
FACT QUESTION FOR THE JURY
Throughout its brief, UBMC has claimed that it terminated Dr. Hardy's contract

because it believed Dr. Hardy's services no longer met the needs of the medical
community. (See UBMC Br. at 28, 29,45, 46 n .12.) As discussed earlier, UBMC did
not offer this justification for terminating the Agreement until well into litigation on this
case. Despite UBMC's assertions to the contrary, (UBMC Br. at 46 n .12), Dr. Hardy
has always agreed that his failure to meet the medical needs of the community would
constitute "just cause" under the Agreement. Dr. Hardy has maintained, however, that
UBMC's post-termination explanation is pre-textual. The critical issue in dispute in this
case is in fact, whether UBMC had a legitimate good-faith reason for terminating the

7

UBMC argues that Dr. Hardy did not preserve the ratification argument, and thus this Court
cannot address it. (UBMC Br. at 47.) Dr. Hardy generally preserved for appeal the issue of
whether UBMC could void the Agreement because it bound UBMC successor boards. (R. 9911018.) Dr. Hardy did not brief the ratification argument before the trial court as a separate basis
for finding the Agreement enforceable. If the Court cannot address the merits of this argument
because it was not separately briefed below, then this Court should nonetheless determine
whether ratification is an available defense for parties like Dr. Hardy.
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Agreement, i.e., "just cause." That was the sole question the trial court had reserved for
the jury. (R. 1023.)
Thus, UBMC's argument that the "just cause" provision of the Agreement did not
"cure" its binding effect (UBMC Br. at 45-47), is unavailing. UBMC successor boards
certainly could have terminated the Agreement if Dr. Hardy's services ever failed to meet
the medical needs of the community. Thus, UBMC successor boards were not
impermissibly bound, and the Agreement is therefore not voidable.
CONCLUSION
This Court should adopt a policy-based, case-by-case rule for determining when
municipal contracts are enforceable against successors. Under a rule that focuses on
whether the new board's policy-making discretion is impaired, it is clear that Dr. Hardy's
"just cause" contract did not improperly bind UBMC successor boards. Successors could
always terminate the Agreement if policy—such as changing needs in the community—
so demanded. UBMC should not be allowed to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract and avoid
paying damages simply because it is a governmental entity. Such a result is poor policy
for this state, and hampers governmental bodies as well as citizens who contract with
them.
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